The Credit Market and the Determinants of Credit Crunches: An Agent Based Modeling Approach by Holmberg, Ulf
The Credit Market and the Determinants of Credit
Crunches:
An Agent Based Modeling Approach
Ulf Holmberg
Department of Economics




This paper presents a credit market model and ﬁnds, using an agent based modeling
approach, that credit crunches have a tendency to occur; even when credit markets are
almost entirely transparent in the absence of external shocks. We ﬁnd evidence sup-
porting the asset deterioration hypothesis and results that emphasize the importance
of accurate ﬁrm quality estimates. In addition, we ﬁnd that an increase in the debt’s
time to maturity, homogenous expected default rates and a conservative lending ap-
proach, reduces the probability of a credit crunch. Thus, our results suggest some up
till now partially overlooked components contributing to the ﬁnancial stability of an
economy.
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During a time span of over twenty years, from the early nineties to present date, nearly all
developed countries have experienced some form of supply side credit crunch in parts of
their economies. Following Udell (2009), economists generally deﬁne a credit crunch as
a "signiﬁcant contraction in the supply of credit reﬂected in a tightening of credit condi-
tions". Thus, during a crunch seemingly eligible borrowers ﬁnd it hard to get credit under
reasonable terms, forcing ﬁrms that rely on external capital to a halt.
Why do providers of credit suddenly mobilise their lending strategies in such a way?
Existing theories provide a useful platform when building an understanding of the deter-
minants of crunches. According to the Risk-Based Capital hypothesis (RBC), the imple-
mentation of new risk-based regulatory rules governing lenders’ allocation of resources,
may have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the supply of credit. Berger and Udell (1994)
tested the RBC hypothesis on the perceived crunch in the United States after the imple-
mentation of the ﬁrst Basel Accord in the late eighties/early nineties. They found some
support in favor of the RBC hypothesis but refrained from ruling out competing theories.
Sharpe (1995), on the other hand, claimed that banks reduce credit supply due to unpre-
dicted losses in bank capital. In analogy with the RBC hypothesis, he concluded that the
reduction in credit coincides with banks having difﬁculties in meeting the minimum reg-
ulatory capital requirements. Pazarbasioglu (1996) found evidence in line with the asset
deterioration hypothesis, suggesting that banks become less willing to supply credit dur-
ing periods associated with a deterioration in asset quality. In addition, according to the
ﬁnancial instability hypothesis, ﬁrst discussed by Minsky (1977, 1992), economies have a
tendency to naturally evolve into a "Ponzi phase" in which ﬁrms are forced to borrow to
meet their obligations on existing liabilities. Since lenders judge liability structures sub-
jectively, sudden drops in the supply of credit may occur when corporate debt reaches
some unforeseen threshold.
Turning to the existing literature on banking and credit, it is well understood that
lenders are forced to deal with excessive information asymmetry problems since borrow-
ers have reason to withhold information in order to gain credit. Lenders seek to resolve
this problem by practicing screening (Allen, 1990) and monitoring (Winton, 1995) thus re-
ducing their exposure to counter party risk. If the estimates used in these procedures are
based on subjective judgments of acceptable liability structures or fail to incorporate risks
driven by exogenous shocks, such shocks may lead to a reduction in credit supply due to
unforeseen losses. In addition, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) developed a real business cycle
model of a credit market in which lending only occurs if the debt is collateralized. Thus,
a recession is ampliﬁed with the decrease in the value of collateral during an economic
1downturn. Further, the burdens of asymmetric information may in itself lead to cyclical
credit and unexpected downturns in lending, a point that is emphasized by Suárez and
Sussman (1997, 2007). They developed a dynamic rational expectations model in which
business cycles are created endogenously. Their ﬁndings indicate that cyclical contrac-
tions of credit are driven by a moral hazard problem between ﬁrms and ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries. This implies that a credit crunch may manifest itself solely due to the inherent
imperfections of the credit market.
Previousliteraturesuggeststhatcreditcrunchesareeitherdrivenbyexogenousshocks
(e.g., new risk based regulatory rules) or caused endogenously by problems springing
from asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender. A natural conclusion
is thus that credit markets grow "safer" with transparency, suggesting that policy makers
concerned with ﬁnancial stability should concentrate their efforts to transparency increas-
ing measures. However, in the light of the money market meltdown of 2008, one cannot
avoid wondering if some other mechanism, inherent in the credit market, is equally to
blame. In this paper, we derive a simpliﬁed banking model in which banks screen ap-
plicants in order to pick suitable clients with an acceptable level of default risk. We use
this model as a base on which we build an Agent Based Model (ABM) of a credit market.
Using this model, we ﬁnd that supply side driven credit crunches occur even if credit
markets are almost entirely transparent. This result originates from the banks’ expecta-
tions about future credit risk. If banks have adaptive expectations about the risk in their
credit portfolios, the credit market may evolve into periods in which banks acquire riskier
debt than what is speciﬁed by its proﬁt maximizing condition. Such periods are swiftly
followed by periods in which banks try to cut back on risky debt, making credit difﬁcult
to obtain. If such cutbacks are coordinated across banks, the market may experience the
eruption of a credit crunch. These crunches are seemingly spontaneous but highly de-
pendent on the level of conservatism practiced when banks pursue their internal credit
risk goals. If banks tend to react slowly to new credit risk goals, i.e. have a conservative
approach to new risky ventures or more risky debt, the probability of a credit crunch is
reduced.
We also ﬁnd that an increase in the debt’s average time to maturity, reduces the prob-
ability of a credit crunch. This result is related to the arguments made in the work of
Andreasen et al. (2011) but differs in terms of the nature of the result. In Andreasen et al.
(2011), the authors argue that banks, by offering long-term credit to ﬁrms, attenuate ﬁrms’
output responses to technological shocks. In this paper, we ﬁnd that the mechanism caus-
ing a decrease in the probability of a credit crunch due to an increase in the maturity time
of debt is far less complicated. An increase in the debts’ time to maturity simply reduces
the probability of sequential bad lending, i.e. it reduces the probability that banks lend
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we are able to ﬁnd evidence in line with the asset deterioration hypothesis as well as to
conﬁrm the importance of accurate estimates in the banks’ screening procedures. Thus,
by adopting the ABM approach, we are able to ﬁnd the determinants of credit crunches
through a simple mechanism linked to the banks’ credit risk valuation procedure while
embracing the possible affects on lending caused by random spillover effects of counter
party risk.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the model. This is followed by a description of the artiﬁcial economy, its
agents and the conditions driving the behavior of the agents. In the ﬁnal sections we
present and discuss the results derived from the simulations and conclude.
2 Theoretical underpinnings
We deﬁne a credit crunch as in Udell (2009), i.e. as a signiﬁcant contraction in the supply
of credit reﬂected in a tightening of credit conditions. Viewing banks as ﬁnancial inter-
mediators and providers of investment capital, this deﬁnition suggests that the onset of
credit crunches are related to the banks’ screening and monitoring procedures. The in-
formation production in imperfect screening and its effects have been previously studied
by Broecker (1990), Chiesa (1998) and Gehrig (1998) among others. However, in this sec-
tion, we seek a simple mechanism that can be linked to the onset of credit crunches. As
such, we initially consider a perfectly transparent credit market such that banks practice
costless and perfect screening in order to reduce their exposure to credit risk. In contrast
to previous studies, we consider a continuum of ﬁrm qualities and view screening as a
method of choosing suitable clients by truncating the distribution function deﬁning ﬁrm
quality.
Consider a two-period economy under the supervision of a ﬁnancial authority. The
economy is made up of a ﬁnite number of risk-neutral ﬁrms, k = 1,..., M, and banks,
i = 1,2,..., N, providing unsecured credit to ﬁrms. Firms are assumed to be heteroge-
neous in terms of quality summarised by θk ∈ [0,1]. At the initial date, ﬁrms are given the
choice of carrying out a risky project lasting one time period. To undertake the project,
ﬁrms need to raise external capital equivalent to lk on the credit market. The gross return
of the investment, R(θk) ∈ [0,∞], is realized after one time period and retrieved with
probability 1 − θk. Firm returns are increasing in θk such that ﬁrm quality also represents
the riskiness of ﬁrm actions. A high quality ﬁrm is thus characterised by a low value of
θk. The distribution of ﬁrm returns are binary and the success rate of the investment is
ﬁrm size independent. For simplicity, it is assumed that in case of failure the ﬁrm de-
3faults without liquidation value, allowing us to interpret θk as the ﬁrm’s probability of
default. Thus, ﬁrms are protected by limited liability such that they only care about the
payoffs when the project succeeds. As such, the ﬁrms always implement their projects
when granted a loan.
Banks act as information producers about the ﬁrms’ investment projects and we let the
banks observe the distribution of ﬁrm quality, f(θ), from which they make a noisy ﬁrm
quality estimate θb
k,i. We let the interest rate on external capital, r, and the deposit rate, ρ,
be exogenous to the model and assume that lending is the banks’ only source of proﬁt.










lk − ρD, (1)
where m is the subgroup of ﬁrms facing their demand towards the representative bank
and D is the bank’s deposits. To purely study the affects of lending while ignoring the
bank’s exposure to deposit risks, it is assumed that the bank ﬁnances lending using a stock
of own capital, i.e. equity. The bank’s equity is given by E such that ∑
ˆ m∈M
k lk ≤ E and E−
∑
ˆ m∈M
k lk ≥ ˆ E where ˆ E is the minimum capital requirement as decided by the ﬁnancial
authorities and ˆ m is the number of ﬁrms granted credit. As such, the deposit costs in (1)
can be ignored. Since banks observe the distribution of ﬁrm quality, the banks’ beliefs
about θk are taken on M. Using this, we rewrite the representative bank’s unconditional
expected proﬁt function in (1) as:
πe





where θe is the expected default rate (quality). From the bank’s expected proﬁt function
in (2), it is fairly obvious that above some value of θe, expected bank-proﬁt turns negative.
More speciﬁcally, in the unconditional case the bank only participates on the credit market
if:
θe ≤ r/(1+ r). (3)
However, as discussed by Gehrig (1998), when a contract is negotiated, banks may prefer
to screen applicants in order to assess their credit risks. As such, it is assumed that the
bank resolves the possibility of negative proﬁts by screening applicants to identify risky
ﬁrms which are removed from the bank’s credit portfolio.
Since we seek a simple mechanism that can be linked to the banks’ lending decisions,
we assume for the remainder of this section that the credit market is perfectly transparent
such that a bank has the ability to practice perfect and costless screening, i.e. θb
k = θk.1




Figure 1: Screening reduces the expected default rate (E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗]).
Recalling the participation constraint in (3), it may be tempting to argue that each bank
lends to ﬁrms with θk ≤ r/(1 + r) up to the point when the bank runs out of equity,
adjusted for the minimum capital requirements. However, the expected proﬁt from a
loan issued to a ﬁrm with high θ and a ﬁrm with a low θ is fundamentally different since
a ﬁrm with a high θ is less likely to repay the debt. Recalling that the economy consists
of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, the heterogeneity of ﬁrm quality leads to a trade-of between
quality and quantity of credit. To see this, we acknowledge that the process of screening
loanapplicantsultimatelyaimstodiscriminatebetweenﬁrmsandonlypickingapplicants
that live up to some minimum requirements for credit (given exogenous interests rates).
Since the bank observes the distribution of ﬁrm quality, f(θ), the screening procedure can
be thought of as choosing a suitable value of a truncating function λ, constructed to be the
function that solves:
E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗(λ)] = λθe, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, (4)
where θ∗(λ) is the truncation point on f(θ), monotonically increasing in λ. Thus, the
criterion needed for credit is represented by θ∗(λ) and the expression in (4) states the
expected default rate (quality) in the subpopulation of ﬁrms below the truncation point,
i.e. the conditional expected default rate. The distribution of ﬁrm quality for some general
distributionisdisplayedinFigure1inwhichweseethatthebank, byscreeningapplicants
and truncating the distribution of ﬁrm quality, reduces its exposure to default risk.
To understand the trade-of between quality and quantity of credit, we move over to
the supply of credit and acknowledge that a bank’s expected credit supply function can be
written as the product of the m ﬁrms’ demand for credit and the probability that a ﬁrm













where ˆ m(θ) is the number of ﬁrm’s eligible for credit. For the analysis below, it is es-
sential to know how screening affects the bank’s expected credit supply. Thus, we con-
sider a tightening in the criterion needed for credit, i.e. a reduction in θ∗. It follows that,
for any probability density function of ﬁrm quality for θk ∈ [0,1] and a ﬁnite sample
of ﬁrms (M), a decrease in θ∗ will shrink the sample size of eligible ﬁrms. This in turn
will reduce the bank’s expected credit supply. Formally, since ∂ ˆ m/∂θ∗ > 0 and since
∑
ˆ m(θ∗)∈m
k lk ≤ ∑
m∈M
k lk, it follows that ∂L/∂θ∗ > 0. This is summarised in the following
Proposition;
Proposition 1: A bank facing a ﬁnite number of applicants (ﬁrms) that tightens the criterion
needed for credit will reduce the amount of supplied credit.
A key result from Proposition 1 is that an there exists some proﬁt maximizing value of θ∗
implying some proﬁt maximizing value of λ. Thus, the bank’s optimization problem boils
down to a decision between quality and quantity of credit. Hence, if the bank tightens the
criterion needed for credit, i.e. it reduces θ∗, fewer ﬁrms will default on their loans but the
supply of credit will drop, reducing the bank’s potential proﬁts. This crucial link between
the bank’s credit supply and the screening procedure of loan applicants provides a useful
platform when forming a understanding of the determinants of credit crunches.
For tractability, let the expected credit supply function be based on the proﬁt maxi-
mizing value of θ∗. This allows us to deﬁne a weight, ω, that scales the now constant
probability in (5). Since θ∗ is monotonically increasing in λ and since E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗(λ)]
is linear in λ, we solve the bank’s expected credit supply function by scaling ω with λ,






Combining (6) with the deﬁnition of the conditional expected default rate in (4) and the
bank’s expected proﬁt function in (2) gives us the bank’s conditional expected proﬁt func-
tion:





6Maximizing (7) with respect to λ and simplifying, results in the bank’s ﬁrst order condi-
tion2:




lk = 0, (8)
such that λ∗ = λ∗ (θe,r) conditioned on the proﬁt maximizing value of θ∗. More speciﬁ-






Since ∂λ∗/∂θe < 0 and since θ∗ is monotonically increasing in λ, it follows that ∂θ∗/∂θe <
0, i.e. an increase in the unconditional expected default rate, reduces the bank’s chosen
truncation point. In addition, since ∂λ∗/∂r > 0, it also follows that ∂θ∗/∂r > 0 such that
the bank tends to accept a higher level of default risk when interest rates are increased.
These results are summarised in Proposition 2;
Proposition 2: A bank that screens applicants in order to maximize proﬁts, tightens the criterion
needed for credit if the unconditional default rate is increased or if the interest rate is decreased.
Since a credit crunch is intrinsically related to the criterion needed for credit, Proposition
2 give some clues regarding the determinants of credit crunches.
We continue with some additional properties of the theoretical model, later to be used
in the artiﬁcial credit market as deﬁned in the next section. By combining (9) with the
deﬁnition of the bank’s conditional expected default rate in (4), we get the bank’s proﬁt
maximizing conditional expected default rate; expressed only as a function of the interest
rate:




The expression in (10) highlights the importance of interest rates on the criterion needed
for credit. Remembering the participation constraint in (3), we conclude that the opti-
mal conditional expected default rate is simply half the unconditional expected default rate.
In addition, since ∂E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗(λ∗)]/∂r > 0, an increase in interest rates increases the
amount of credit risk undertaken by banks, as previously implied in Proposition 2. By
substituting for (9) and (10) in (7), we express the bank’s proﬁt maximizing conditional
expected proﬁt function in terms of the models exogenous variables:








2For illustrative reasons the regulatory bodies restriction is ignored.
7with ∂E[πb|θk ≤ θ∗(λ∗)]/∂r > 0 and ∂E[πb|θk ≤ θ∗(λ∗)]/∂θe < 0. Studying the implica-
tions of (11), we see that the bank expects positive proﬁts by screening out unwanted
ﬁrms, conditioned on perfect estimates of ﬁrm quality; a result that follows from the
bank’s "monopoly" power in the screening procedure. However, by viewing the bank’s
expected proﬁts as expected revenue, (11) also corresponds to the bank’s expected deposit
costs in a perfectly competitive economic environment.
Summing up our ﬁndings so far, in this section, we have derived a simple theoreti-
cal banking model in which banks maximize proﬁts by removing risky ﬁrms from their
credit portfolios. Despite its simplicity, the model is able to highlight the importance of
ﬁrm quality and interest rates on the criterion needed for credit. Since a credit crunch
relates to a period in time in which credit and investment capital are hard to obtain, we
argue that a tightening of the criterion needed for credit, and its determinants, is intrinsi-
cally related to the onset of a credit crunch. Despite this, however, the theoretical model
fails to capture the distinctive nature of credit crunches. Credit crunches are by deﬁnition
dynamic phenomena since the tightening of the criterion needs to be coordinated across
banks throughout a period of time. In addition, in a credit market with a ﬁnite number
of participants, the decision made by a single bank may affect the pool of potential bor-
rowers of its competitors and it is unlikely that banks face the full set of ﬁrms at every
instant. To cope with these issues, we view the credit market as a complex adaptive sys-
tem and proceed with constructing an artiﬁcial credit market based on the insights from
the theoretical model.
3 An artiﬁcial credit market
Through the theoretical two-period model, we found variables that inﬂuence the repre-
sentative bank’s decision regarding the criterion needed for credit. However, the model
fails to capture the dynamics of a credit market. In addition, in a credit market with a
ﬁnite number of participants, the decision made by one bank may affect the pool of po-
tential borrowers of its competitors. To cope with these issues, we view the credit market
as a complex adaptive system as deﬁned in Tesfatsion (2006). Thus, we construct an Agent
Based Model (ABM) of a credit market based on repeated debt contracts. The theoretical
model in the previous section is used as the base on which we build the ABM. This al-
lows us to study the credit market in a dynamic framework, without imposing additional
restrictive assumptions on the agents behavior. In addition, the ABM allows for random
spillover affects of counter party risk. We begin by deﬁning the details of the artiﬁcial
economy and proceed by deriving the decision rules governing the agents’ behavior.
83.1 The model
We ﬁrst consider the matching process of ﬁrms and banks. In reality, this process is likely
to be affected by some randomness making the initial match stochastic. In addition, as
discussed in the large literature on relationship banking (see Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992),
Petersen and Rajan (1994), Petersen and Rajan (1995) among others), the initial lending
may create some information advantage for the initial lender which then leads to some
ex-post monopoly situation. However, since we view the interest rate on external capital
as exogenous, we can safely ignore the potential ex-post monopoly effect since the lend-
ing standards of credit will remain unaffected in either case. Thus, we focus on the initial
stochastic matching process and situate the ABM on a ﬁnite spaced torus populated with
an initial number of ﬁrms (k = 1,..., M0) and banks (i = 1,..., N0) spread out on a grid
at random. Time is discrete and represents new possible debt contracts and/or maturity
dates. Following the arguments made in the previous section, ﬁrms need external capital
in order to undertake a risky project. Firms search the torus for external capital through a
360o random walk where the torus is of size b2 and where b ∈ Z is divisible with remain-
der. Thus, by situating the agents on a ﬁnite spaced torus, the probability of a ﬁrm-bank
encounter is partly given by the "density" of the credit market, D(Mt, Nt,b).
Banks are governed by a ﬁnancial authority stipulating a regulatory rule requiring
banks to hold own capital based on the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) such that for any
given bank and time:
CARi,t ≥ K, 0 ≤ K ≤ 1, (12)
where K represents the minimum capital requirements. All debt owned by the bank is
unweighted and the sum of a bank’s Tier-capital is equivalent to the bank’s equity capital,
henceforth referred to as the banks equity.
When a ﬁrm encounters a bank, the ﬁrm states its demand for credit which the bank
evaluates according to the regulatory rule in (12). If the bank lives up to the requirement,
it makes a noisy estimate of the ﬁrm’s probability of default, θb
k,i = θk + φk,i with support
[0,T ] where φk,i is a random draw from a normal distribution with zero mean and stan-
dard deviation σf. Estimates outside of the support region are re-estimated. If the bank’s
estimate of ﬁrm quality is below the truncation point, i.e. if θb
k,i ≤ θ∗
i,t, a debt contract
is formed. If the bank rejects the ﬁrm’s demand for credit, the ﬁrm continues its search
for a debt contract. The debt lasts for a minimum of κ time periods and is only repaid
upon a ﬁrm-bank encounter, making the maturity date of the contract stochastic. Thus,
we allow for different maturity dates without specifying the details in the debt contract.
Here, it is important to note that a large value of κ increases the average time to maturity.
In addition, we limit the effect on credit crunches caused by a single ﬁrm’s performance
9by prohibiting ﬁrms in debt from additional borrowing until the debt is repaid.
Given the above, the probability of a ﬁrm-bank encounter depends on the debt’s min-
imum time to maturity (κ) as well as on the "density" of the credit market (D). Since a
ﬁrm in debt is restricted from signing a new debt contract until the previously acquired
debt is repaid and since debt contracts are only formed when a ﬁrm encounters a bank;
these variables implicitly deﬁne the agents’ abilities to sign new debt contracts as well
as the "ﬂow of funds". Relating this to the market liquidity literature, in which market
liquidity is deﬁned as the ability to trade an assets at short notice (Nikolaou, 2009); we
acknowledge that the debt’s minimum time to maturity (κ) and the density of the credit
market (D), jointly determine something we may call "credit market liquidity" (ψ(κ,D)).
When exploring the properties of credit market liquidity within the model context, we
acknowledge that a sparsely populated credit market (relative to the size of the torus)
may experience random demand-side drops in credit, reducing the overall indebtedness
of ﬁrms. However, if D is large, sudden drops in the aggregate debt level only reﬂects
the decisions made by the suppliers of credit. Thus, by keeping the density of the market
high, we are able to study the effects on credit crunches caused by variations in credit
market liquidity originating from variations in the minimum time to maturity (κ).
Following this line of reasoning, we state the probability of a debt contract being







The ﬁrst term in (13) determines how the frequency (from the simulations) in the debt
contract formation is affected by credit market liquidity. The second two terms determine
how the probability of a debt contract is affected by the supply side of credit.
Using the deﬁnition of a credit crunch as a period in time in which credit and invest-
ment capital is hard to obtain, sudden reductions in the supply of credit can be tracked
back to the speed by which new debt contracts are formed. Since the probability in (13)
depends on the capital adequacy ratio as well as the acceptable level of credit risk, the
model has the ability to capture effects on credit crunches caused by the implementation
of new regulatory rules as well as the effects caused by a deterioration in ﬁrm quality. In
addition, since reductions in credit supply needs to be coordinated across banks in order
for a credit crunch to erupt, we state the probability of a debt contract being formed by








Hence, the complement of (14) deﬁnes the probability that no debt contract will be signed
attimet, arguablyanimportantcomponentdeterminingtheprobabilityofacreditcrunch.
10Since the probability that a contract will be signed at time t depends on Pr(CARi,t ≤
K), the probability in (14) relates to the bank’s ability to build up capital; which in turn
is effected by the bank’s expected proﬁt function and the criterion needed for credit. In
addition, since the bank’s choice of θ∗ will depend on its previous encounters and since
the market hosts a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, the bank’s debt portfolio is indirectly dependent
on the debt portfolios of its competitors. This since lending reduces the pool of eligible
ﬁrms. Returning to (13) and acknowledging that the probabilities by this reasoning are
dependent, we see that the model allows for random spillover affects of counter party
risk.
3.2 The Firms
We seek to keep the ﬁrms as simple as possible in order to make the simulations tractable.
Thus, we assume that ﬁrms are "born" debt free with a pre-speciﬁed initial value of equity,
E
f
0, identically distributed across ﬁrms. In addition, we let ﬁrms be deﬁned by the balance







t , t ≥ 1,
where A
f
t is the ﬁrm’s asset value, E
f
t is the ﬁrm’s equity value and L
f
t is the value of ﬁrm
liabilities at time t. As in the previous section, we let ﬁrms be protected by limited liability
and assume a need for external capital to fund some risky project. Hence, by the same
arguments as in Section 2, they always implement their projects when granted credit. We
let the demand for credit vary between time periods to capture the randomness associated
with investment opportunities. However, we limit the demand for credit to ﬁnite values





where ηt ∼ U(0,1) resulting in 0 ≤ lt ≤ E
f
t .
Turning to the granting of credit, as previously mentioned, lending may only occur
upon a ﬁrm-bank encounter at which the bank estimates the quality of the ﬁrm. If the
bank’s estimate of ﬁrm quality lies below the truncation point while the bank meets the
requirements made by the model’s regulatory body, the ﬁrm is granted credit from the
bank to fund a risky project. The project lasts until the loan’s maturity date on which
the ﬁrm generates a gross return of RTm if the project succeeds, where Tm = t + τ(κ,D)
denotes the loan’s maturity date with ∂τ/∂κ > 0. Here, market density (D) affects the
debt’t time to maturity since it determines the probability of a ﬁrm-bank encounter. Thus,
as previously argued, the debt’s maturity date is stochastic.
11When determining the equation of motion deﬁning the evolution of the ﬁrms’ asset
values, we seek a mechanism that links the performance of ﬁrms to their quality. We
use the results in the work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) such that the
probability that a ﬁrm defaults on its loan can be derived from its asset value. Assuming




t , we write the equation of
motion deﬁning the representative ﬁrm’s asset value as:3
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where Φ−1(θ) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution taken at ﬁrm quality and
where∆WTm ∼ N(0,1). Firm quality is drawn from a truncated two parameter beta distri-
bution, θ ∼ Beta(α, β)|θk<T , where the beta distribution is chosen for its ability to replicate
bounded distributions of ﬁrm quality. Note that (15) requires T ≤ 0.5 such that θ ∈ [0,0.5]
due to the symmetry of the standard normal distribution.
Given (15), the asset value of the ﬁrm remains constant between maturity dates and
the ﬁrm defaults with probability θ when the project’s proﬁt is realized. If the asset value
of the ﬁrm drops below zero, the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy and fails to meet its obliga-
tions to the bank. Thus, we have a steady ﬂow of ﬁrms exiting the credit market through
bankruptcy forcing the need of a ﬁrm-entry process. The ﬁrm-entry process is deﬁned by
assuming a saturated market. Thus, we let the ﬁrm-entry process be governed by a simple
rule requiring the number of ﬁrms active in the credit market at time t to be approximately
equal to the constant and pre-speciﬁed ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, Mt ≈ M. Hence, in every
time period the model gives birth to dt−1 new ﬁrms, where dt−1 is the number of ﬁrm
defaults in the previous time period. Such an entry process will in the long run affect
the distribution of ﬁrm quality due to the resampling of θ from f(θ). This effect is sum-
marised in the following Proposition;
Proposition 3: Consider an increase in t. If the market is saturated such that it supports a
maximum of M ﬁrms at each time period, the resampling of ﬁrm quality from f(θ) reduces the
unconditional expected default rate, θe
t.
Proposition 3 states that since ﬁrms with a high value of θk have a high probability of
default and since θk is drawn from the truncated beta distribution; a consequence of the
ﬁrm-entry process is that the economic environment grows "safer" with time. Less risky
ﬁrms will simply crowd-out the riskier ones. To see this, order ﬁrm quality such that
θ1,t < θ2,t < ···θMt,t and let Sl denote the state of ﬁrm l < Mt. Let the state of ﬁrm default
3See Appendix A for details.
12be denoted Ω such that Pr(Sl = Ω) < Pr(SMt = Ω). Since the sample estimate of the ﬁrst
central moment of θ is given by ∑
Mt















In analogy with the theoretical model in the previous section, banks use equity to provide
ﬁrms with loans. The equity value of the banks at the initial date, Eb
0, is pre-speciﬁed
and identically distributed across banks. At the end of each time period, banks will have
accumulated proﬁts from matured loans, funded new projects using its equity and suf-
fered from defaulted loans. Using this, we construct the equation of motion deﬁning the























, t ≥ 1,
where Ab
t is the bank’s asset value, Eb
t is the bank’s equity, Lb
t is the value of the bank’s
outstanding debt, mt ∈ Mt is the number of ﬁrms facing their demand towards the rep-
resentative bank, ˆ mn
t is the number of ﬁrms granted credit at time t, ˆ mt is the number of
ﬁrms in the bank’s debt portfolio at time t and where md
t is the number of ﬁrms repaying
their debt at time t.
As in the previous section, banks maximize proﬁts by screening applicants in order to
pick suitable clients with an acceptable level of default risk. This is done by truncating the
distribution function deﬁning ﬁrm quality. The functional form of the truncating function
can be speciﬁed in various ways reﬂecting the decision making process within the bank
(e.g., if the decisions are taken at the central or decentralized level). This makes the model
ﬂexible for variations in corporate structure. Here, we assume that the bank’s manage-
ment has absolute control over the truncating function allowing us to treat λ as the bank’s
decision variable. As such, the solution to the bank’s optimization problem in the artiﬁcial
economy bears obvious resemblance to the results derived in the previous section. To see
this, deﬁne the value of the truncating function at time t as λi,t. Using the results in the
previous section while acknowledging that the banks now rely on noisy estimates of ﬁrm
quality, we rewrite the representative bank’s objective function as:4
E[πb,t|θb
k,t ≤ θ∗






4Since E[θb] = E[θ] + E[φ] = θe.
13We condition on the proﬁt maximizing value of θ∗ and maximize (16) with respect to λt,
including the regulatory bodies constraint (12). This gives us the optimal value of the









if CARt > K
0 if CARt ≤ K,
,
indicating that in an economic environment with ﬁxed interest rates, the criterion needed
for credit only varies with the estimate of θe
t. Recalling that ∂θe
t/∂t < 0 and that ∂λ∗
t /∂θe
t <
0, it follows that ∂θ∗
t /∂t > 0, using that θ∗
t is monotonically increasing in λt. In other
words, a bank tends to decrease the criterion needed for credit with the passage of time.
Proposition 4: Consider an increase in t. If the market is saturated such that it supports a max-
imum of M ﬁrms at each time period, a bank that screens applicants to maximize proﬁts will tend
to reduce the criterion needed for credit with time.
From Proposition 4 it follows that banks tend to take on more risky debt as the economy
evolves. However, the economy will suffer from short term ﬂuctuations around the time
path of the criterion needed for credit due to noisy estimates of ﬁrm quality. To see this,
we acknowledge that E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗
t (λ∗
t)]  = E[θ|θb
k ≤ θ∗
t (λ∗
t)] where the inequality is due
to imperfect estimates of ﬁrm quality.5 It is reasonable to assume that banks learn about
the quality of ﬁrms by interim information production, Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and
Holmström and Tirole (1997). Thus, we assume that the bank observes the true quality of
ﬁrms for the subpopulation of ﬁrms currently in its debt portfolio. Using this, we let the





k θk,t−1/ ˆ mt−1.
Relating this to the proﬁt maximizing conditional default rate in (10), we let the bank
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where 0 ≤ c ≤ r/(2(1 + r)) is a parameter representing the speed by which banks move
towards the optimal truncation point. In addition, the bank is refrained from lending if
CARt ≤ K, honouring the regulatory rule in (12).
5See Appendix B for details.
14Examining the iterative procedure deﬁning θ∗
t above, we acknowledge four things.
First, since the optimal truncation point, θ∗
t , represents the criterion needed for credit and
since the truncation point determines the riskiness of the bank’s credit portfolio; move-
ments towards the optimal truncation point can be thought of as movements towards the
bank’s internal credit risk goal. Thus, c represents the speed of adjustment to the bank’s
internal credit risk goal. Second, given the parameter space of c, the bank may "overshoot"
its own credit risk goal and acquire a debt portfolio characterized by more risky debt than
in (10). This opens up for periods characterised by "over-lending" in which over-lending
banks try to reduce their exposure to credit risk by tightening the criterion needed for
credit. Third, if such a tightening occurs simultaneously across banks, the economy may
move into a time period in which credit and investment capital is hard to obtain. Fourth,
the bank’s initial debt contracts may inﬂuence the bank’s future decision regarding θ∗. To
reduce this effect, we set θ∗
0 = 0 allowing the bank to steadily build up the riskiness of its
credit portfolio using the iterative procedure as stated above.
Banks with a low value of c take small steps towards the optimal level of credit risk.
Hence, the bank’s speed of adjustment to its internal credit risk goal reﬂects the level of
conservatism within the bank’s organisational structure where conservative banks have a
relativelylow value of c. Relating c to the real world, the speed of adjustment to the bank’s
internal credit risk goal can be thought of as a parameter reﬂecting the bank’s willingness
to engage in new risky ventures or as its willingness to use new and unexplored debt
instruments characterised by more unexplored risk. Since we are interested in the deter-
minants of credit crunches, we study the case in which all banks are equally conservative.
This allows us interpret c as a parameter reﬂecting the general level of conservatism in the
economy.
4 Simulations
In order to ﬁnd the determinants of credit crunches, we simulate the artiﬁcial economy
in different economic states, implementing the framework discussed in the previous sec-
tions.6 We ﬁrst deﬁne a restrictive measure of a credit crunch within the context of the
model and then explore the properties of the artiﬁcial economy through a selected sim-
ulation. The selected simulation is chosen as to illustrate the features of a progressive
economy populated with many creditworthy ﬁrms.
When deﬁning a restrictive and measurable variable of a credit crunch, we ﬁrst recall
the deﬁnition in Udell (2009), suggesting that a credit crunch is reﬂected in a tightening
6The NetLogo environment is used for the simulations. The code is available on request.
15of credit conditions, here represented by a decrease in θ∗
i,t. Thus, if the average truncation
point drops below some threshold, investment capital becomes hard to obtain since only
a small sample of ﬁrms are eligible for credit. Using this, in the absence of a stringent




i,t = 0, ∀i, t > 0
0, if else
, (17)
such that δ = 1 in the case of a credit crunch which by all means of measurement, repre-
sents an increase in the criterion needed for credit. Arguably, the indicator variable in (17)
relatesto the probability in (14) since ∑
N
i θ∗
i,t → 0 ⇒ Pr(Contractt) → 0. However, the def-
inition above neglects the potential effects on the supply of credit caused by (i) the banks’
potential inability to live up to the capital requirements, and (ii) the potential effects on
crunches caused by risk based regulatory changes affecting (14) through Pr(CARi,t ≥ K).




in which banks have close to perfect ﬁrm quality estimates (σf = 0.0001) and where the
unconditional expected default rate (θe
t) is lower than the banks’ optimal expected default
rate as stipulated in (10). Thus, since T = 0.5, ex-ante we may expect banks with almost
perfect ﬁrm quality estimates to set θ∗
i,t = 0.5 . However, since banks may oversample
from the pool of risky ﬁrms, occasional decreases in the average truncation point is ex-
pected. The parameters of the beta distribution are chosen to be α = 2.6 and β = 150 such
that ﬁrm quality is distributed with a heavy tail to the right. Given this, the unconditional
expected default rate at the initial time period is θe
0 ≈ 1.7 percent. The interest rate on
external capital is set to r = 4 percent such that the optimal conditional expected default
rate is 1.92 percent, i.e. 22 basis points higher than the unconditional expected default
rate. We set the minimum capital requirements at K = 8 percent, replicating the capital
requirements enforced by the bank for international settlements in Basel, assuming that
banks are refrained from holding capital to mitigate future risks. Figure 2 illustrates the
evolution of debt and the average truncation point in an artiﬁcial economy lasting 5000
time periods where the ﬁrst 500 observations have been removed in order to get rid of
transients. The model is simulated with M0 = 2000 ﬁrms, N0 = 5 banks and the torus
is constructed from b = 11. The initial equity of the banks is set to Eb
0 = 2 and ﬁrms are
born with E
f
0 = 1. The level of conservatism in the economy, i.e. speed of adjustment








































































Figure 2: Sum of ﬁrm debt (L
f
t ) (solid line) and the average truncation point (θ∗
t ) (gray
line).
to the banks’ internal credit risk goals, is set to c = 0.02 and the debts minimum time to
maturity is set to κ = 10.
From Figure 2 we see that the aggregated debt level has a positive trend, exhibiting
cyclical tendencies. In addition, we acknowledge that ﬁrm debt is closely related to vari-
ations in the average truncation point (the criterion needed for credit). The average trun-
cation point occasionally deviates from the proﬁt maximizing solution and at t = 4440
the economy evolved into a two period credit crunch. The crunch, and the preceding de-
crease in the average truncation point, caused a 58.37 percent drop in debt compared to
the aggregate debt’s local maximum at t = 3640. Since all parameters are held constant
during the simulation period, this indicates that crunches have a natural tendency to oc-
cur; this even if banks have near to perfect estimates of ﬁrm quality in the absence of new
regulatory rules or sudden variations in ﬁrm quality.
During the time period preceding the credit crunch, the aggregate debt level experi-
enced growth, despite occasional decreases in the average truncation point. The sudden
downturnindebtduetothespontaneouslycoordinatedtighteningofthe criterionneeded
for credit (reduced θ∗
i,t), forced the onset of a credit crunch. Recalling the lending mech-






























Figure 3: Value of lending to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms by Swedish banks in billion SEK. Source:
Statistics Sweden.
riodic over-lending, acquiring a debt portfolio characterised by more risk than the proﬁt
maximizing level of credit risk. When realized, the banks seek to "wash-out" previously
acquired bad debt by tightening the criterion needed for credit. For comparison, Figure 3
exhibits the evolution of lending made by Swedish banks to Swedish non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
from January 1998 to November 2011. The series shows a reduced growth in lending after
the internet bubble of 2001 and a sharp drop in lending during the aftermath of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis of 2008. By comparing the evolution of lending during the ﬁnancial crisis and
the evolution of debt in the artiﬁcial economy, we see an obvious resemblance.
The evolution of the average of ﬁrms’ assets, on the other hand, is characterised by
a positive trend as illustrated in Figure 4. On average, the ﬁrms’ asset values grew with
5 basis points per time period.7 The positive trend is frequently broken by sequential
downturns due to reduced lending and sequential ﬁrm defaults. Such "busts" are highly
dependent on the criterion needed for credit since the equation of motion deﬁning the
evolution of ﬁrms’ asset values is deﬁned by ﬁrm quality. Time periods characterised
by little or no lending reduces the supply of investment capital. As such, ﬁrms have no
means of funding potentially fruitful projects, reducing the aggregate growth level of ﬁrm
7We only measure ﬁrms active on the credit market, i.e. ﬁrms granted credit at least once, since non-
participants have a constant asset value deﬁned only by E
f
0.




















Figure 4: Average of ﬁrms’ assets (A
f
t ).
assets. In addition, the series is characterised by seemingly random "booms" caused by an
increase in project funding and numerous successful projects. Furthermore, we acknowl-
edge that the series shows signs of increased volatility after the onset of the credit crunch
at t = 4440 due to the small number of new debt contracts.
4.2 The determinants of credit crunches
From the selected series, we acknowledge that the artiﬁcial credit market has a natural
tendency to spontaneously evolve into a credit crunch. However, the determinants of
crunches remain undetermined. In order to ﬁnd the parameters of the model that can
be held accountable for sudden supply side drops in credit, data is collected from sim-
ulations of the artiﬁcial credit market, limited to sequences of 5000 time periods. The
experimental plan used in the study is presented in Table 1.
Since credit market liquidity, ψ, is jointly determined by the minimum time to matu-
rity (κ) and the density of the market, D(Mt, Nt,b), we choose to hold the size of the torus
(b2) constant throughout the simulation periods since variations in this parameter only
varies the density of the market. In addition, since all debt is unweighted in this version
of the model, we deem it unlikely that regulatory changes between states will affect the
criterion needed for credit. Thus, we keep the minimum capital requirements (K) constant
at 8 percent in all simulations. Since the parameters of the beta distribution deﬁnes the
19Table 1: Experimental plan used for the simulations.
Variables Treatments
Conservatism (c) 0.0001 0.01
Interest rate (r) 2% 4%
Initial number of ﬁrms (M0) 1000 2000
Initial number of banks (N0) 3 5
Minimum time to maturity (κ) 1 10
α, β 1.67,100 2.5,150
σf 0.0001 0.01
Constants Value
Minimum capital requirements (K) 8%
Initial truncation point (θ∗
i,0) 0
Initial bank capital (Eb
i,0) 2
Initial ﬁrm equity (E
f
j,0) 1
Torus size parameter (b) 11
evolution of ﬁrm assets as well the probability of ﬁrm default, these parameters represent
the state of the economy. The parameters of the beta distribution are varied in two states
such that θe
0 takes on the same value for different values of α and β in a subset of the sim-
ulations.
Given the experimental plan in Table 1, we simulate the artiﬁcial economy in 256 dif-
ferent states with 100 replications resulting in a total of 25 600 observations. If the econ-
omy experiences a crunch during a simulation period, the result is documented and a
new simulation is initiated. Thus, the onset of a credit crunch is deﬁned as a dichotomous
variable with one observation per simulation run. We acknowledge that the variable of
interest is dependent on the vector of observables such that the probability of a crunch
can be estimated using a standard logit model. To determine how the parameters of the
beta distribution affect the probability of a credit crunch we estimate two models. The
estimates from the logit models are displayed in Table 2 from which we only seek to in-
terpret the signs of the estimates due to the theoretical nature of the model.
Examining Table 2, we conclude that an increase in the speed of adjustment to the
banks’ internal credit risk goals (c) has a positive effect on the probability of a credit
crunch. This implies that a more conservative approach to lending reduces the probability
of sudden supply side drops in credit, even in the absence of variations in the economic
20Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates from the logit models on credit crunches (δ). All
parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level, n = 25600.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 2.8792 10.726
Conservatism (c) 540.31 527.28
Interest rate (r) −383.66 −375.20
Initial number of ﬁrms (M0) −0.0004 −0.0004
Initial number of banks (N0) −0.6529 −0.6415
Initial unconditional expected default rate (θe
0) 505.65




Nagelkerke R2 index 0.8254 0.8213
conditions; this being a partially overlooked component contributing to the ﬁnancial sta-
bility of an economy. In addition, an increase in the debts’ minimum time to maturity (κ)
decreases the probability of a credit crunch. This result suggests that an increase in the
average time to maturity reduces the probability of a credit crunch. We also see that an
increase in market density, working through an increase in the initial numbers of ﬁrms
(M0) and banks (N0), reduces the probability of a credit crunch.
To fully understand these ﬁndings, we need to view them in the light of how the arti-
ﬁcial economy is constructed. Due to random movements of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms on a
torus, banks do not meet the full distribution of eligible ﬁrms at every instant. Since banks
have adaptive expectations about the credit risk in their debt portfolio, they continue to
increase θ∗
i,t until the credit risk in its debt portfolio equals/or overrides their proﬁt maxi-
mizing level of credit risk. Acknowledging that ﬁrms are allowed to make repayments on
matured debt in every time period, the risk associated with a bank’s debt portfolio can in-
crease rapidly if the bank grants credit to risky ﬁrms at the same instant as less risky ﬁrms
meet their obligations to the bank. Thus, the faster a bank adjusts to its internal credit risk
goal, i.e. the larger the c, the higher the probability of retrieving a debt portfolio deﬁned
by a suboptimal expected default rate. Simultaneous reductions in truncation points due
to spontaneous wash-outs of bad debt may then lead to an absolute tightening of the cri-
terion needed for credit, forcing the onset of a supply side credit crunch. As such, if the
lending capacities of banks are locked in contracts with long maturity dates, the prob-
21ability of hastily increasing the bank’s credit risk goal above the bank’s optimal level is
reduced. Thus, an increase in the minimum time to maturity (κ) decreases the probability
of issuing credit to numerous risky ﬁrms at the same instant as less risky ﬁrms repay its
debt, reducing the probability of a poorly diversiﬁed credit portfolio. This result indicates
that an increase in the maturity time of debt may offset some of the negative side effects
caused by rapid variations in the banks’ truncation points.
The effects on crunches caused by the parameters of the beta distribution are more eas-
ily understood if we view them in the light of this new insight. If α is increased, the mode
of the distribution deﬁning ﬁrm quality is moved to the right, reducing the proportion
of ﬁrms afﬂicted with an acceptable default risk. Hence, an increase of α can be thought
of reducing the sample size of eligible ﬁrms. A rapid increase in the truncation point,
conditioned on a relatively large value of α, may result in an oversampling of risky ﬁrms
from the bank’s perspective, forcing a tightening of the criterion needed for credit. This
corresponds to an increase in the unconditional expected default rate (θe) since an increase
in α moves the mode of the truncated beta distribution to the right. Thus, an increase in
the unconditional expected default rate at the initial date (θe
0) increases the probability of
a credit crunch, as previously suggested in the theoretical part of this paper. In contrast,
an increase in β reduces the probability of a credit crunch. Such an increase centers the
probability density mass around the mode of the distribution, increasing the "distance" to
riskier loans. This can be thought of as homogenising ﬁrm quality which tends to reduce
the probability of a crunch.
Since θk is drawn from the truncated beta distribution and since θk deﬁnes the evolu-
tion of ﬁrm assets, the results regarding the parameters of the beta distribution are fully in
in line with predictions from the asset deterioration hypothesis. In addition, we ﬁnd that
an increase in interest rates (r) has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on the probability of
a crunch. Relating a credit crunch to the criterion needed for credit, this result is fully in
line with the ﬁndings in the theoretical part of this paper. If the interest rate is lowered,
the pool of ﬁrms that have the ability to bear a positive contribution to the banks’ expected
proﬁts is reduced. The banks react to this by only granting credit to a subgroup of ﬁrms
that add positive value to the banks’ expected proﬁts. Rapid variations in the banks’ trun-
cation points may then lead to an oversampling from the segment of value reducing ﬁrms
with reduced lending as a direct consequence.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper analyses the determinants and causes of credit crunches. We start by deriving
a simple theoretical banking model in which banks screen applicants in order to pick
22ﬁrms with an acceptable probability of default. We then use the mechanisms from the
theoreticalmodelandconstructanAgentBasedModel(ABM)ofacreditmarket. Through
simulations of the ABM, we show that crunches have a natural tendency to occur if banks
have adaptive expectations about the risk in their credit portfolios. We also ﬁnd that an
increase in the speed by which banks adjust to their internal credit risk goals, increases the
probability of a credit crunch. We link this parameter to the level of conservatism in the
market and conclude that a more conservative approach to lending leads to fewer credit
crunches; an up till now partially overlooked component contributing to the ﬁnancial
stability of an economy. In addition, we are able to show that the onset of crunches are
affected by variations in the market conditions deﬁning the evolution of ﬁrm assets. If the
economy is in a state characterised by few creditworthy ﬁrms, the probability of a credit
crunch is increased, fully in line with the asset deterioration hypothesis. In addition,
we ﬁnd that homogenous markets, in terms of ﬁrm quality, tends to be associated with
a lower probability of a credit crunch. The simulations also show that an increase in
the debts time to maturity reduces the probability of a credit crunch since the lending
capacities of banks are locked in credit with long maturities. This, in turn, reduces the
probability of a poorly diversiﬁed credit portfolio. Thus, this paper adds new insights to
current theory as well as provides new perspectives on the nature of sudden reductions
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25Appendix A: The ﬁrms’ asset values
Assume that the representative ﬁrm has a calendar-time counterpart that acts on a credit
market where the time horizon is represented by Tm. Fix a probability space (Ω,F,P)
on which there is a standard Brownian motion W. Let (Ft)t∈Tm be a ﬁltration on the
probability space such that the σ-algebra Ft represents the collection of observable events
up to time t. Given the above, it is assumed that the asset value of the ﬁrm’s calendar-time





t dt + σA
f
t dWt, (A.1)
where W is a standard Brownian motion under the probability measure P. Moving over





t (µ∆t + σ∆Wt). (A.2)
Since the evolution is bounded by the endpoint, Tm we let Wt−τ = Wt−1 such that the
ﬁrm’s asset value remains constant between maturity dates. Given this, we let time evolve



























Tm−1 + σ∗∆WTm. Use that L
f
Tm−1 is constant between maturity dates













Tm−1 < 0) = Pr(ETm−1 + σ∗∆WTm < 0) = θ. Solve for the σ∗
Tm




Tm−1/Φ−1(θ) where Φ−1(θ) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution
taken at ﬁrm quality. Thus, we rewrite the representative ﬁrm’s equation of motion as:
A
f




where θ ∈ [0,0.5] due to the symmetry of the standard normal distribution.
26Appendix B: Expected default rates
Let θk represent realizations of f(θ) and let φk represent realizations from f(φ). We seek
the conditional expected default rate conditioned on a measurement error in expectations,
i.e. E[θ|θb ≤ θ∗] = E[θ|θ + φ ≤ θ∗] = E[θ|θ ≤ θ∗ − φ] = E[θ|θ ≤ ˆ θ∗]. As such, we have a
random truncation, selected out of a density f(ˆ θ∗). Since φ ∼ N(0,σf) it follows that ˆ θ∗ ∼
N(θ∗,σf). However, we truncate the distribution such that ˆ θ∗ ∈ [0,T ]. Given this, the
expected truncation point is:
E[ ˆ θ∗|0 ≤ ˆ θ∗ ≤ T ] =
! T
0
ˆ θ∗f( ˆ θ∗)d ˆ θ∗
Fˆ θ∗(T ) − Fˆ θ∗(0)
,
where Fˆ θ∗(x) is the cumulative distribution function of ˆ θ∗. From this it follows that:





k ≤ θ∗] =




where Fθ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of θ. Hence, the bank fails to ﬁnd the
optimal expected default rate.
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